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INTRODUCTION
The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) is the most 
ambitious bilateral trade agreement of all time.2 Although average tariff 
levels between the two partners are relatively low, various non-tariff bar-
riers (NTBs)—often in the form of domestic regulations—continue to 
create obstacles for transatlantic investors.3 The TTIP negotiations will 
focus on reducing NTB costs and increasing investor protection with 
the addition of a controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
1  Juris Doctor Candidate, American University-Washington College of Law, 2014.
2  Countries and Regions: United States, EUROPEAN COMMISSION DICTORATE GENERAL 
FOR TRADE, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-
states/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
3  See Joseph Francois et al., Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and 
Investment, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH (MAR. 2013) AT 1, available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf. 
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mechanism that allows foreign investors to sue host states for alleged 
breaches of the treaty’s substantive rules through private arbitration.4
NGOs and government officials from the EU and U.S. have expressed 
concern regarding investor-state arbitration under TTIP including the 
potential for increased litigation and the compromise of public policy.5 
As a result, opposition toward investor-state arbitration may have a det-
rimental effect on negotiations due to the intense political scrutiny. The 
European Commission (“EC” or “Commission”) has faced a significant 
amount of pressure from public interest groups and recently announced 
it would hold public consultations on the proposed EU text of TTIP’s 
ISDS mechanism.6
This article argues that critics’ fears are exaggerated and an ISDS 
mechanism within TTIP would not result in increased disputes or 
compromised public policy. By exploring how past agreements and the 
increase of investor-state arbitration, provide the foundation for these 
concerns, this Article explains how critics fail to consider the U.S. and 
EU’s extensive efforts to limit foreign investor protection. Additionally, 
the aim is to assess the unique characteristic of the US-EU partner-
ship and how the existing investment relationship decreases the risk 
of increased investor-state arbitration under TTIP. The Article will 
also explore justification for the ISDS mechanism within agreements 
between developed countries and elaborate on additional steps the U.S. 
and EU could take to suppress remaining fears surrounding an increase 
in investor-state arbitration. If installed correctly, the TTIP ISDS mech-
anism would increase transatlantic investment by instilling confidence 
and reducing risk for foreign investors without forcing countries to alter 
public policy or national laws that protect their citizens.
4  Glyn Moody, EU Mandate For TAFTA Leaked: Includes Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution For Intellectual Monopolies, TECH DIRT BLOG (MAY 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130530/12171523255/eu-mandate-tafta-leaked-
includes-investor-state-dispute-resolution-intellectual-monopolies.shtml.
5 European Commission Faces Serious Debate Over TTIP Investment Rules, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Oct. 18, 2013), https://wtonewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppvu
ser&view=login&return=aHR0cHM6Ly93dG9uZXdzc3RhbmQuY29tL2NvbXBv 
bmVudC9vcHRpb24sY29tX3Bwdi9JdGVtaWQsNDQ1L2lkLDI0NTAxNjMv.
6  Press Release, Commission to Consult European Public On Provisions in EU-
US Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, European 
Commission (Jan. 21, 2014), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=1015.
2014 A Case For Investor-State Arbitration Under The Proposed 77
 Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership
I. The Growth of the ISDS Mechanism and Growing Concern of 
Litigation and Corporate Power
ISDS is a system that allows private investors to sue a host state for 
the alleged violation of an investment treaty concluded between the host 
state and the investor’s country of origin. These ISDS rules are included 
in most of the nearly 3,000 international investment agreements (IIA)7 
and are unique in that they often allow investors to file claims with inter-
national arbitration tribunals without initiating proceedings before a 
national court.8 ISDS rules are included in all of the bilateral investment 
treaties (BIT) between new EU Member States and the U.S and men-
tioned in the EC’s negotiating mandate as an element the Commission 
intends to include within the TTIP.9 The US 2012 Model BIT, a blue-
print for US investment negotiations, also contains extensive rules on 
investment protection and arbitration.10
Investor-state arbitration by an independent tribunal was originally 
created to protect companies from weak court systems in developing 
countries.11 However, the increased practice between global leaders 
has allowed corporations to gain more power in challenging host-
state regulations, even in developed states. Over the last two decades, 
7  International investment agreements can be bilateral or involve more parties. 
Investment-related clauses can also be included in broader agreements, notably free 
trade agreements. 
8  David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor – State Dispute Settlement: A 
Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (2012) at 10, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf (presenting the results of a survey of more than 
1,600 investment treaties and conclude that more than 90% of them provide for 
investor-state dispute settlement. In some of them, ISDS only relates to disputes over 
expropriation).
9  See EU Draft Text On ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences To U.S. Approach, 
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2013) [hereinafter EU Draft Text on ISDS Contains 
Similarities, Differences To U.S. Approach], http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-
General/Public-Content-World-Trade-Online/eu-draft-text-on-isds-contains-
similarities-differences-to-us-approach/menu-id-896.html.
10  SHAYERAH AKHTAR AND MARTIN WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 43052, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2013) at 8, 11 
[hereinafter U.S. International Investment Agreements].
11  Christoph Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, UNIV.VIENNA 
INT’L L.J. 15, 15-16 (2006) available at www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/85_
cspubl_86.pdf (discussing the role of private investment in economic development and 
the importance of developing countries revising attitudes towards FDI).
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investor-state arbitration has increased from a few dozen cases in 1992 
to 514 cases by the end of 2012.12 In 2012, the number of known treaty-
based ISDS cases filed under IIAs grew by nearly sixty cases.13 This 
constitutes the highest number of known treaty-based disputes ever filed 
in one year.14
While the number of cases brought to arbitration is small compared 
to the thousands of investments that benefit both the host countries 
and companies investing in them, recent cases brought by investors 
against states have given rise to strong public concern. Recent claims 
have challenged the impact of policies such as environmental and labor 
regulations, emergency economic measures related to the 2008-2009 
economic crisis, and cultural protection laws, among others. The main 
concern is that the current investment protection rules may be abused to 
prevent countries from making legitimate policy choices.
Among the cases that have caught the most public attention are the 
on-going cases Vattenfall v. Germany and Philip Morris v. Australia.15 
Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, brought a claim against the 
German government (under the Energy Charter Treaty) after its deci-
sion in 2011 to speed up the phase-out of nuclear power generation.16 
Philip Morris has also challenged the government of Australia for its 
decision to ban brand names on cigarette packs (the ‘plain packag-
ing’ measure) for reasons of public health.17 These cases have not yet 
been decided and it is impossible to gauge whether either case will be 
successful. However, it is important to note that neither Germany nor 
12  Recent Developments In Investor State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD INT’L 
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE, (2013) at 1 [hereinafter UNCTAD 
Recent Developments In ISDS], available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf (The number of known treaty-based ISDS cases filed under 
international investment agreements grew by at least 58 in 2012.).
13  Id. at 1.
14  Id. at 2-3 (noting that of the 58 new cases, 37 were filed by investors from 
developed countries.) 
15  Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/12) [hereinafter Vattenfall] and Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The 
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12. [hereinafter Philip 
Morris].
16  See id.; see also The Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (13. 
AtGAndG v. 31.07.2011, BGBl I S. 1704 (No. 43)) (beginning on August 6, 2011).
17  See Philip Morris, supra note 15 (arguing that warning labels on cigarette packs 
and plain packaging prevent it from effectively displaying its trade mark, causing a 
substantial loss of market share).
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Australia have been influenced or forced to make any changes to their 
policies as a result of the cases brought by the investors.
Fears of increased disputes and compromised public policy have 
compelled countless nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to speak 
out against the TTIP agreement and other IIAs that include investment 
protection mechanisms.18 Critics argue that the TTIP agreement would 
empower EU and U.S. corporations “to engage in litigious wars of attri-
tion to limit the power of governments on both sides of the Atlantic.”19 
They claim that the tremendous volume of investment between the EU 
and U.S. and their investors’, who already frequently use investor-state 
arbitration, will inevitably lead to an exorbitant increase in arbitration 
under TTIP.20
It is true that U.S. and EU investors are among the most frequent 
users of the dispute settlement procedures and account for a growing 
18  See e.g., Investment Rights Stifle Democracy, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY 
(last updated Apr. 26, 2011), http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2011/04/investment-
rights-stifle-democracy; Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher Byrnes, Philip Morris 
v. Uruguay: Will investor-State arbitration send restrictions on tobacco marketing 
up in smoke?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Jul. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Porterfield, 
Byrnes], available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-
will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/.; 
Letter from Senator Maralyn Chase and Rep. Sharon Treat to Ambassador Ron Kirk 
(Jul. 5, 2012) (enclosing letter signed by state legislators from all 50 states and Puerto 
Rico stating strong opposition to the inclusion of ISDS provisions in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)); Letter from Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue to Ambassador Ron 
Kirk (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/TACD-TAFTA-
letter-3-5-13.pdf (expressing concern for any deal that dismantles existing EU and 
US consumer protection); Kanaga Raja, EU-US Deal Could Unleash a “Corporate 
Litigation Boom”, THIRD WORLD ECONOMICS (Jun. 2013), http://twnside.org.sg/title2/
twe/2013/547/5.htm; A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights: Investor Privileges 
in EU-US Trade Deal Threaten Public Interest and Democracy, CORPORATE EUROPE 
OBSERVATORY (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/
download/ttipinvestment-oct2013.pdf (“Investor-state dispute settlement under the 
proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European 
Union and the United States would empower EU- and US-based corporations to 
engage in litigious wars of attrition to limit the power of governments on both sides of 
the Atlantic”).
19  A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights: Investor Privileges in the EU-US Trade 
Deal Threaten Public Interest and Democracy, CORP. EUROPE OBSERVATORY (Oct. 
2013) at 3, available at http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
transatlantic-corporate-bill-of-rights-oct13.pdf.
20  Id. at 1.
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number of cases. Of the 514 known disputes, U.S. investors have filed 
24% (123) of all cases while EU investors have filed 40%.21 Of the 52 
total cases initiated in 2012, EU investors were behind 60% of all ini-
tiations, while U.S. investors accounted for 7.7%.22 Despite these argu-
ments access to private investor-state arbitration under TTIP does not 
automatically imply that U.S. and EU investors will increase the use of 
investor-state arbitration or if they do, be successful.
II. Unfounded Fear of Increase in Investor Disputes and Corporate 
Control In EU and U.S.
The criticism aimed at the TTIP’s ISDS mechanism fails to con-
sider significant policy revisions made by the U.S. and EU to improve 
their individual ISDS mechanisms under existing BITs with other 
countries and limit foreign investor protection. These accusations are 
also unsupported by the low number of claims brought under existing 
BITs between U.S. and individual EU Member states and the low rate 
of success of claims brought against good governance countries such as 
Germany, France, the UK, and the U.S.
A.  Less Favorable Post-NAFTA Investment Agreements
Interest groups that have expressed criticism of investor-state arbi-
tration under TTIP frequently cite the 60 disputes filed under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11 to justify accusations that the same will result under the 
transatlantic agreement.23 However, those critics fail to consider the sig-
nificant changes the U.S. and EU have made in recent years in response 
to the number of disputes created under NAFTA.
The U.S.’s 2004 Model BIT is an example of these efforts, which 
developed from concerns that foreign investor protections were too 
broad under NAFTA and therefore foreign investors received more 
favorable treatment under the agreement than U.S. investors received 
21  UNCTAD RECENT DEV. IN ISDS, supra note 12 at 4 (explaining that the number of 
known treaty-based ISDS cases filed under international investment agreements grew 
by at least 58 in 2012.).
22  Factsheet on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 
3, 2013) at 5, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/doc/2013/october/
tradoc_151791.pdf.
23  Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under NAFTA and Other 
U.S. ‘Trade’ Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/investor-state-chart.pdf.
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under U.S. law.24 The 2004 Model contains several additions includ-
ing a narrower definition of investment covered under the agreement, 
a narrower minimum standard of treatment, more detailed provisions 
on investor-state arbitration, provisions to enhance the transparency of 
national laws and proceedings, as well as language addressing envi-
ronmental and labor standards.25 The 2004 Model BIT was used as the 
basis for the U.S.’s BITs with Uruguay and Rwanda and no investor-
state dispute claims have risen under those two agreements.26 It is also 
relevant to note that Philip Morris, a U.S. company, decided to bring a 
claim against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT because the 
U.S. BIT did not provide enough investor protection.27
Shortly after taking office in 2009, the Obama Administration sus-
pended ongoing BIT negotiations to further review the scope of inves-
tor protection and ensure the Model BIT “was consistent with public 
interest and the Administration’s overall economic agenda.”28 The 2012 
Model BIT added new transparency requirements requiring parties to 
publish proposed regulations, explain their purpose and rationale, allow 
public comments, and address such comments when adopting the final 
regulations.29 These new provisions could forestall a percentage of 
investor-state arbitrations, since the new provisions give investors an 
opportunity to discuss the effects of regulatory amendments and host 
states a chance to reevaluate proposed changes before final promulga-
tion. The 2012 Model also expands the scope of labor and environmen-
tal obligations by an affirmative responsibility on parties to ensure they 
do not waive or derogate from domestic or labor laws.30 Unless the U.S. 
suddenly reverses course in its treaty negotiating, the terms of the TTIP 
24  U.S. International Investment Agreements, supra note 10 at 9.
25  Id.
26  Id.; see also Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, 
UNCTAD, [hereinafter UNCTAD Treaty-Based ISDS Database], http://iiadbcases.
unctad.org (including information on known treaty-based ISDS cases that are pending 
or concluded) (last visited on Jan. 20, 2014).
27  PORTERFIELD, BYRNES, supra note 18. 
28  U.S. International Investment Agreements, supra note 10 at 9.
29  2012 MODEL U.S. BILATERAL INV. TREATY, UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
art. 10-11 [hereinafter 2012 Model U.S. BIT] (adopted on Apr. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.
pdf.
30  See id. art. 13 (noting that the 2004 model contained a more aspirational provision, 
calling only for the parties to “strive to ensure”).
82 THE ARBITRATION BRIEF Volume 4
investment chapter are likely to be less favorable to European investors 
than already-existing BITs.
The Commission is also working to improve investment dispute pro-
visions by clarifying investment protection rules and improving how the 
dispute settlement system operates.31 These improvements are intended 
to address concerns raised that investment protection rules may nega-
tively impact states’ rights to regulate.32 The Commission has stated that 
all EU FTAs will confirm the parties’ “right to regulate and to pursue 
legitimate public policy objectives such as social, environmental, secu-
rity, public health and safety, and the promotion and protection of cul-
tural diversity.”33 Additionally, the EU has introduced a code of conduct 
in order to deal with conflicts of interests among arbitrators that are 
serving on tribunals.34
The EU and the U.S. are also committed to a more transparent arbi-
tration system and are exploring the creation of an appellate mechanism. 
It was reported that the EC’s June 2012 draft text included transparency 
provisions similar to those included in the Obama Administration’s 2012 
Model that require parties’ legal submissions be made public, hearings 
be open to the public, and non-disputing parties be allowed to submit 
amicus briefs.35
The EU’s June 2012 draft text also included language describing a 
possible appellate mechanism for private arbitration under the agree-
ment.36 While no provisions requiring the consideration of an appellate 
mechanism are included in the U.S. model BIT, U.S. FTAs with Korea, 
Colombia and Panama include an annex to the investment chapter stat-
ing that the “parties will consider establishing such a mechanism for 
investor-state disputes three years after the FTA enters into force.”37
31  Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU Agreements, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2 (Nov. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Investment Protection and ISDS 
in EU Agreements], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/
tradoc_151916.pdf (summarizing the importance of investment agreements and steps 
taken to improve the ISDS mechanism within EU investment agreements).
32  See id. at 1.
33  See id. at 7.
34  See id. at 9.
35  EU Draft Text on ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences To U.S. Approach, 
supra note.
36  Id.
37  Id.
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Experts have also reported that a revised version of the European 
Commission’s draft mandate includes further provisions to guard against 
frivolous legal claims, bringing the EU more closely in line with U.S. 
positions in past FTAs and investment treaties.38 Individual EU mem-
ber-state BITs have traditionally excluded these disposal mechanisms 
but it is similar to what the EU recently proposed during the CETA 
negotiations with Canada.39 These frivolous claim provisions closely 
reflect text in the US Trade Act of 2002.40 Mechanisms reflecting this 
principle were also included in subsequent free trade deals such as the 
U.S-Morocco and U.S.-Korea FTAs, and a number of U.S. BITs.41 In 
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, the ability for an arbitral tribunal to evaluate 
whether a claim is frivolous is also part of the procedure through which 
a state may preliminarily object to a complainant’s claim on the basis 
that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider it.42
B.  Existing Investment Relationship Between U.S.  
and EU Members
Perhaps the most convincing argument against the risk of increased 
disputes and arbitration is the current investment relationship between 
the U.S. and individual EU member countries. The U.S. currently has 
BITs with eight EU members43 in former transition economies dating 
back to the early and mid-1990s.44 There have been no claims brought 
against the U.S. under those treaties.45 There have been eleven claims 
38 Stuart Trew, Revised EU Mandate Seeks To Prevent ‘Frivolous’ Investor-State 
Claims, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Revised Mandate Seeks To 
Prevent Frivolous Claims], http://wtonewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppvuser
&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d0b25ld3NzdGFuZC5jb20vY29tcG9uZW50 
L29wdGlvbixjb21fcHB2L0l0ZW1pZCw0NDYvaWQsMjQzNTM4OS8=.
39  See id. 
40  U.S. Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. §2102(b)(3)(G)(i) (2002) (stating 
that investment measures should include “meaningful procedures for resolving 
investment disputes,” while also including “mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims 
and to deter the filing of frivolous claims”). 
41 Revised Mandate Seeks To Prevent Frivolous Claims, supra note 38.
42  2012 U.S MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., art. 28.
43  Bulgaria (1994); Croatia (1992); Czech Republic (1992); Estonia (1997); Lativia 
(1996); Lithuania (2001); Poland (1994); Romania (1994).
44  United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://
www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
45  UNCTAD Treaty-Based ISDS Database, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
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against EU members by U.S investors—however, five of those claims 
were brought before the responding countries became members of the 
EU.46 Also, of the claims with known results, no tribunal awarded in 
favor of the U.S. investor47 and no claims were brought in 2012 and 
2013.48
When assessing the likelihood of increased litigation against devel-
oped EU members and the U.S., the track record for investor-state 
arbitration shows that the proportion of claims against “good gover-
nance” countries like Germany, France, and U.S. are extremely low.49 
A standard created by the World Bank, ‘good governance’ is associated 
with democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, the rule of law, 
and efficient public services.50 Countries, like the U.S. and developed 
economies within the EU, possess a low track record for investor-state 
arbitration cases brought against them and possess a very high success 
rate in the small number of claims that are brought.51 The U.S. has never 
lost an investor-state claim.52 Also, the U.S. has been party to agree-
ments providing for investor-state arbitration since the early 1980’s, 
which includes about forty BITs and FTAs with about twenty-five more 
states.53 The only agreement under which the U.S. has ever been sued in 
investor-state arbitration, and the only claimants (with one exception) 
has been to Canada.54 There have been no other claims under any other 
investment agreement.55
C. Cost
Cost also provides a disincentive for bringing investor-state claims. 
Having more investors does not mean more claims if investors decide 
46  Id. (counting claims brought against Poland in 1996; Czech Republic in 1999, 
Estonia in 1999; Romania in 2001 and 2005).
47  Id.
48  Id.
49  Mark Kantor, Comment on USCIB on Investor-State in the TPP, INT’L ECON. L. 
AND POLICY BLOG (May 11, 2013), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2011/05/
uscib-on-investor-state-in-the-tpp.html.
50  What is Governance, THE WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx#home (last visited on Jan. 20, 2014).
51  UNCTAD Treaty-Based ISDS Database, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined..
52  INT’L ECON. L. AND POLICY BLOG, supra note 49
53  Id.
54  Id.
55  Id.
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they are no more likely to succeed than those that have already sued the 
U.S. or an EU member state.56 The average cost of arbitration is $8 mil-
lion per party, approximately 82 percent of which is legal fees and most 
take several years to conclude.57 This is partly due to the fact that many 
legal issues remain unsettled, meaning extensive resources must be used 
to develop a legal position by closely studying previous arbitral awards. 
Under the ICSID rules, each member of the arbitral panel can claim 
a daily fee of $3,000 plus expenses, while billing rates for arbitration 
lawyers run up to $1,000 per hour.58 The EU’s initiative to prevent frivo-
lous claims by making the losing party pay costs will also contribute to 
investors’ hesitation in bringing frivolous claims.59
Critics of TTIP and the ISDS mechanism have failed to consider the 
changes made within the modern trading system and the low record of 
disputes against the U.S. and leading EU member states. The additional 
measures taken by the U.S. and EU to revise investor policy as well as 
the incredible track record of success of the U.S. and EU good gover-
nance countries in investor-state claims will prevent companies from 
bringing a surge of claims against the U.S. or EU.
III. Justification for Investor-State Arbitration Within  
Developed Countries
The purpose of IIAs is to encourage inflows of capital and technol-
ogy needed for economic growth by reducing legal and political risk.60 
Especially in developing countries, domestic resources are not enough 
to generate the needed growth to improve the lives of their people and 
56  See GAVIN THOMPSON, LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, SN/EP/6777, INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
1 (2013) [HEREINAFTER G. THOMPSON], available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/
publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06777/investorstate-dispute-settlement-isds-
and-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip (responding to common 
questions about investor-state dispute settlement provisions).
57  See id. at 4.
58  See id.
59  Investment Protection and ISDS in EU Agreements, supra note 31, at 8.
60  Peter H. Chase, The United States, European Union, and International Investment, 
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC 
ECONOMY BLOG (Jul. 2011) 1 2 [hereinafter Peter Chase], http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/chase_us_eu_intlinvestment_jul111.pdf (summarizing 
the importance of international investment treaties within developing countries).
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foreign capital is required as well.61 These countries recognize, how-
ever, that foreigners may be wary of putting money into countries about 
which they know little and will do so only if they get a high enough rate 
of return to cover the perceived risks.62 Investment agreements provide 
guarantees to help assuage investor’s concerns and reduce the need for 
other inducements to attract foreign capital.
It is easy for one to assume that developed countries do not need fur-
ther investor protection to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
transnational companies. However, UNCTAD’s 2013 World Investment 
Report states that for the first time ever, developing economies absorbed 
more FDI in 2012 than developed countries, accounting for 52 percent 
of global FDI flows.63 FDI inflows to developed economies declined by 
32 percent to $561 billion—a level last seen almost 10 years ago.64 The 
EU alone accounted for almost two thirds of the global FDI decline.65 
At the same time, FDI outflows from developed countries also dropped 
to close to 2009 levels.66 UNCTAD forecasts FDI in 2013 to remain 
close to the 2012 level, with an upper range of $1.45 trillion—a level 
comparable to the pre-crisis average of 2005-2007.67 The TTIP and its 
ISDS mechanism will contribute to economic recovery within the EU 
and U.S. by removing low barriers to trade and creating a more confi-
dent and predictable investing environment.
Although investors will be able to go to domestic courts within the 
U.S. and EU to enforce their legal rights under TTIP (and will continue 
to do so in most cases), the ISDS mechanism provides three purposes 
that domestic courts cannot. It addresses the international obligations of 
the host government under the agreement when steps taken legally under 
domestic law allegedly violate the treaty promises on discrimination, 
61  See id. at 2 (noting developing countries’ need for foreign direct investment).
62  See id. (highlighting the need for incentives and investment protection for 
developing countries in order to attract foreign investment).
63  World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2013) at 30 [hereinafter 2013 World 
Investment Report], available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&es
rc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fvi.unctad.
org%2Fdigital-library%2F%3Ftask%3Ddl_doc%26doc_name%3D873-world-inves
t&ei=MlreUqHUIKSvsQT3lYH4Bg&usg=AFQjCNEa5FFCKIghgVaxM_jtxxrF9x-
uOQ&bvm=bv.59568121,d.cWc.
64  Id. at 13.
65  Id.
66  Id. at 9.
67  Id. at 12.
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expropriation, or obstruction of transfer.68 It ensures a neutral venue 
to hear the complaint when domestic courts may have difficulty deal-
ing with differences between domestic and international obligation.69 
Last but not least, it depoliticizes the conflict, so the government of the 
investor does not have to decide whether to sue the host country, and 
investors need not depend on their own governments to undertake what 
is often a diplomatically sensitive step to protect their investments.70 
Despite the overall quality of the U.S. and EU court systems, it is not 
unreasonable for a foreign investor from either location to be concerned 
about the potential for corruption and discrimination in regulatory deci-
sions. The existence of investor-state arbitration gives foreign investors 
more confidence than an independent impartial tribunal that is available 
to them if required for such a rare situation.
As for U.S. investors going abroad, fear that courts within developed 
economies like the UK, France, and Germany may be unjustified, but 
that is not true for all 28 EU-member states. For transitioning econo-
mies within the EU—with weaker judicial and regulatory systems and a 
higher level of corruption and incompetence—investor-state arbitration 
offers a more adequate alternative to local courts.71 This is also one rea-
son why developed states in the EU are so reluctant to give up their own 
intra-EU BITs with weaker EU-member economies despite pressure to 
do so from the Commission.72
It is also legitimate for foreigners to be concerned about whether 
independent and impartial regulatory and judicial treatment is always 
available in the U.S. For example, Transparency International-USA 
noted this when the TI 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index was released: 
“[t]he United States ranks 19th in this year’s CPI, lower than many of 
68  Peter Chase, supra note 60, at 3-4.
69  Id.
70  Peter Chase, supra note 60, at 4.
71  See Transition Economies: An IMF Perspective on Progress and Prospects, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Nov. 3, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/
ib/2000/110300.htm (listing Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine as transitioning 
economies within the EU).
72  Luca Schico, Member State BITs after the Treaty of Lisbon: Solid Foundation 
or First Victims of EU Investment Policy, COLLEGE OF EUROPE, 17 (2012), available 
at http://aei.pitt.edu/39283/1/researchpaper_2_2012_schicho_final.pdf (describing 
reluctance by Member States to give up their intra-EU BITs with other EU members). 
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its partners in the OECD.”73 The U.S. ranking confirms that Americans 
believe there are continued transparency and corruption issues in local, 
state, and national government institutions and processes.74 Claudia 
Dumas, President and CEO of Transparency International—USA also 
adds, “while the United States has a commendable record of enforcing 
its anti-bribery laws, greater efforts must be made to increase transpar-
ency and accountability in U.S. governance. This includes strengthening 
the ability of prosecutors to pursue undisclosed conflicts of interest by 
government officials.”75
Litigation will continue to be brought in U.S. courts because of the 
favorable investor law such as the Administrative Procedures Act and 
Tucker Acts while U.S. investors will predominantly use EU member 
state local law. However, the ISDS mechanism will provide the ade-
quate protection for investors in special circumstances. ISDS provides 
the needed guarantee to companies that their investments will be treated 
fairly and on an equal footing with domestic companies.
IV. Further Safeguards and Alternatives
Although the U.S. and EU have taken significant steps to create 
a more transparent, fair, and effective ISDS system, challenges and 
concerns remain regarding arbitrators’ impartiality and independence, 
forum shopping, consistency of arbitral decisions, and a lack of a 
review system.76 These challenges have prompted further debate regard-
ing a number of alternatives the U.S. and EU have addressed and may 
consider when negotiating the TTIP agreement. These options include 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the creation of an appellate mech-
anism, tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs, and the 
creation of an international investment court.
73  Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2012), http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last accessed December 2, 2013.
74  Press Release, Transparency International, Corruption still widely perceived as 
pervasive–Transparency and accountability are focal points for United States (Dec. 
5, 2112), available at http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20121205_
corruption_still_widely_perceived_as_pervasive.
75  Id.
76  Catherine Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: An Overview, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 183, 184 (2006) 
[hereinafter Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement] (introducing 
current concerns within the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism).
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An ADR mechanism, especially evaluative mediation, is increas-
ingly attracting more favorable support in business for reasons such 
as cost control, efficiency, confidentiality, preservation of relationship, 
informality, and flexibility.77 Evaluative mediation is a right-based form 
of ADR where a third-party neutral looks at the disputing parties’ posi-
tional briefs and evaluates them objectively in light of her expertise to 
predict how they would fare in a legally binding decision or arbitra-
tion.78 If mediation reaches an impasse, arbitration can be resorted to 
as a fallback with the same person as the mediator and arbitrator or a 
different person as the arbitrator as the parties might agree.79 It is also 
noteworthy that the settlement rate of investor-state disputes at ICSID 
before any final award is rendered is estimated approximately at 30-40 
percent.80 Given the high success rate, ISDS by mediation should to be 
explored further.
An investment appellate body at the international level could also 
enhance the consistency, predictability, and perceived impartiality of 
decisions rendered by arbitral tribunals. Consistency of jurisprudence 
creates predictability and enhances the legitimacy of the investment 
arbitration system.81 Under the current system, however, rulings by a 
panel do not set a precedent for future cases, and sometime the decisions 
by different panels conflict.82 An appellate mechanism could provide a 
more uniform and coherent means for challenging awards of traditional 
77  Nadja Alexander, The Mediation Meta Model: Understanding Practice Around 
the World, 26 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 97 (2008) (noting that attention must be paid to a 
mediation type that caters to the accountability of dispute resolvers [state authority or 
representatives] to tax payers).
78  Munir Maniruzzman, A Rethink of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (May 30, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/05/30/
a-rethink-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement/ (describing the increase in ADR’s 
popularity within ISDS).
79  See id. (noting that this process should be structured and sequential given the fact 
that the state party needs to get its position evaluated for public accountability purposes 
before it can explore an interest-based resolution of the dispute with its counter-party).
80  Sergey A. Voitovich, Agreed Settlement v. Unfavourable Award in Investment 
Arbitration, 13 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 718, 720 (2012).
81  KATIA YANNACA-SMALL, ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 629 (2010).
82  Bill Krist, Investor-State Dispute Settlement—Fix it, Don’t Ditch It, AMERICA’S 
TRADE POLICY (Oct. 29, 2013), http://americastradepolicy.com/investor-state-dispute-
settlement-fix-it-dont-ditch-it-2/#.Ut5yphb0BJU.
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bases.83 There are, of course, challenges to this model, such as the logis-
tics of selecting members, ensuring the timely resolution of disputes 
and the need to have a certain number of states participate before the 
system would be effective.84 However, mechanisms such as the WTO’s 
Appellate Body provide a current model for an effective mechanism in 
this respect and a handful of FTAs contain provisions that contemplate 
the introduction of an appellate body in the future.85 Although the EU 
and U.S. have discussed the idea of establishing an appellate mecha-
nism, neither entity has taken meaningful steps to bring this potential 
feature to fruition. This feature in particular, if created, could resolve 
a great deal of controversy spurred by NGOs and other critics of TTIP 
and its ISDS mechanism.
In addition to the appellate mechanism, UNCTAD suggests tailor-
ing the existing system through individual international investment 
agreements to promote consistency.86 This option implies that main 
features of the existing system would be preserved and individual coun-
tries would apply tailored modifications by altering aspects of the ISDS 
system within their new investment agreements.87 Some countries are 
already pursuing procedural innovations including: setting time limits 
for bringing claims, increasing the contracting parties’ role in interpret-
ing the treaty to avoid legal interpretations that go beyond the original 
intent, and establishing a mechanism for consolidation of claims.88 The 
U.S. has more transparency in its ISDS mechanism through the 2012 
Model BIT and the EU has included a mechanism for an early discharge 
of frivolous claims.89 Coupled with the renegotiation of existing treaties 
and increasing regional integration, changes like these could clarify and 
improve law that is applicable to ISDS. 
As the U.S. and the EU move forward with TTIP negotiations, it 
is important for both parties to seriously consider creative alternatives 
83  See Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 76 at 
12 (outlining advantages to adopting an appellate mechanism for investment disputes).
84  Rachel Nicolson, Hilary Birks, & Laura Bellamy, Focus: A Different Roadmap 
for Investor-State Dispute Settlement?, ALLENS LINKLATERS LLP (Jul. 23, 2013), http://
www.allens.com.au/pubs/ibo/foibo23jul13.htm.
85  See id.
86  2013 World Investment Report, supra note 63 at 113.
87  Id.
88  Id.
89  See 2012 Model U.S. BIT, supra note 29 at art.11 and 29. See also Investment 
Protection and ISDS in EU Agreements, supra note 31 at 8.
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because TTIP will be used as a model for future international invest-
ment law.
CONCLUSION
Trade between the U.S. and the EU countries now accounts for 
almost half of global economic output. The 28 EU-member states are 
by far the U.S.’s largest trading partner. If the TTIP comes to fruition, it 
will be the biggest trade agreement in history, potentially adding $420 
billion per year to the global economy and creating over two million 
jobs. Despite the economic need for the TTIP agreement, negotiations 
have been slowed by pushback from public groups that express exagger-
ated fears surrounding the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
These groups fail to consider the existing trade relationship between the 
EU and U.S., the measures each partner put in place to restrict inves-
tor protection, and the realistic implications of investor-state dispute 
resolution and those measures. If modeled after recent IIAs, the ISDS 
mechanism within TTIP will provide investors with added confidence 
of adequate protection without forcing countries to alter public policy 
or national laws that protect their citizens. The TTIP will remove regula-
tory hurdles that are now imposed by governments, increase confidence 
in a neutral dispute settlement venue, and serve as a model for future 
international trade law.
